G0010 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Turla

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Turla is a cyber espionage threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). They have compromised victims in over 50 countries since at least 2004, spanning a range of industries including government, embassies, military, education, research and pharmaceutical companies. Turla is known for conducting watering hole and spearphishing campaigns, and leveraging in-house tools and malware, such as Uroburos.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: IRON HUNTER Group 88 Waterbug WhiteBear Snake Krypton Venomous Bear Secret Blizzard BELUGASTURGEON — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 30 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Uroburos, PsExec, Net.⁷¹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1007 System Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

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T1025 Data from Removable MediaCollection

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T1027.005 Indicator Removal from ToolsDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1027.011 Fileless StorageDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1069.001 Local GroupsDiscovery

T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.003 Mail ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1078.003 Local AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090 ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1102 Web ServiceCommand & Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

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T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1120 Peripheral Device DiscoveryDiscovery

T1124 System Time DiscoveryDiscovery

T1134.002 Create Process with TokenPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1201 Password Policy DiscoveryDiscovery

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1213.006 DatabasesCollection

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T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1546.013 PowerShell ProfilePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.004 Winlogon Helper DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1553.006 Code Signing Policy ModificationDefense Evasion

T1555.004 Windows Credential ManagerCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1564.012 File/Path ExclusionsDefense Evasion

T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

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T1570 Lateral Tool TransferLateral Movement

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T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1584.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1584.004 ServerResource Development

T1584.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1615 Group Policy DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

UroburosS0022 · Malware

PsExecS0029 · Tool

NetS0039 · Tool

TasklistS0057 · Tool

RegS0075 · Tool

EpicS0091 · Malware

SysteminfoS0096 · Tool

ATT&CK S0096 ↗

+22 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 30 tools/malware to G0010 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0010 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0010 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

68 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

30 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

13 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.