G0021 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Molerats

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Molerats is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Operation Molerats Gaza Cybergang — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including PoisonIvy, DustySky, Spark, SharpStage.¹⁹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 2 — Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1027.015 CompressionDefense Evasion

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218.007 MsiexecDefense Evasion

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

●

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2 — furthest is 2 · Keys to the kingdom. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

PoisonIvyS0012 · Malware

ATT&CK S0012 ↗

DustySkyS0062 · Malware

ATT&CK S0062 ↗

SparkS0543 · Malware

ATT&CK S0543 ↗

SharpStageS0546 · Malware

ATT&CK S0546 ↗

DropBookS0547 · Malware

ATT&CK S0547 ↗

MoleNetS0553 · Malware

ATT&CK S0553 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0021 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

16 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.