Threats / Actors / Threat Group-3390

G0027 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Threat Group-3390

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims. The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Earth Smilodon TG-3390 Emissary Panda BRONZE UNION APT27 Iron Tiger LuckyMouse Linen Typhoon — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 24 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, pwdump, gsecdump.⁶⁰

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.002 Security Account ManagerCredential Access

●

T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.006 Windows Remote ManagementLateral Movement

●

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1027.015 CompressionDefense Evasion

T1030 Data Transfer Size LimitsExfiltration

●

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.002 AtExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1055.012 Process HollowingPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

●

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

●

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

●

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.005 Network Share Connection RemovalDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1074.002 Remote Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

●

T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

●

T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

●

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

●

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

●

T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply ChainInitial Access

●

T1199 Trusted RelationshipInitial Access

●

T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

●

T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

●

T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesLateral Movement

●

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

●

T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1555.005 Password ManagersCredential Access

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T1560.002 Archive via LibraryCollection

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T1562.002 Disable Windows Event LoggingDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

●

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

●

T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1588.003 Code Signing CertificatesResource Development

T1608.001 Upload MalwareResource Development

T1608.002 Upload ToolResource Development

T1608.004 Drive-by TargetResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

Windows Credential EditorS0005 · Tool

pwdumpS0006 · Tool

gsecdumpS0008 · Tool

PlugXS0013 · Malware

China ChopperS0020 · Malware

ATT&CK S0020 ↗

gh0st RATS0032 · Malware

ATT&CK S0032 ↗

NetS0039 · Tool

ATT&CK S0039 ↗

+16 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 24 tools/malware to G0027 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0027 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0027 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge — Known exploits / Linked CVEs every link below traces to a named source; tier is explicit

Inferred / reported — lower confidence, never headline attribution 1 link(s)

These are not confirmed attribution. An inferred link is a structural ATT&CK chain (this group uses a tool whose reference cites the CVE); it is back-cited to the original report and never claims the source names the group.

CVE-2015-5119 →

ATT&CK attributes gh0st RAT (S0032) to this group, and that software’s ATT&CK reference cites CVE-2015-5119. Structural chain — not a statement that the report names the group.

original report (cited on the ATT&CK software page) ↗

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

57 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

24 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

10 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.