G0032 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Lazarus Group

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission…

Attributed to North Korea — RGB (Reconnaissance General Bureau) by government advisory.¹²³¹²⁴

Also tracked as: Labyrinth Chollima HIDDEN COBRA Guardians of Peace ZINC NICKEL ACADEMY Diamond Sleet — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2019–2020approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignOperation Dream Job. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0022.¹²²

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 26 tools/malware to this group, including route, netsh, Responder, Volgmer.⁹⁶

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1001.003 Protocol or Service ImpersonationCommand & Control

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1008 Fallback ChannelsCommand & Control

T1010 Application Window DiscoveryDiscovery

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin SharesLateral Movement

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T1021.004 SSHLateral Movement

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T1027.007 Dynamic API ResolutionDefense Evasion

T1027.009 Embedded PayloadsDefense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.003 Rename Legitimate UtilitiesDefense Evasion

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or ServiceDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

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T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

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T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolExfiltration

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1070 Indicator RemovalDefense Evasion

T1070.003 Clear Command HistoryDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.006 TimestompDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

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T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.002 External ProxyCommand & Control

T1098 Account ManipulationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1104 Multi-Stage ChannelsCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

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T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

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T1124 System Time DiscoveryDiscovery

T1132.001 Standard EncodingCommand & Control

T1134.002 Create Process with TokenPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1202 Indirect Command ExecutionDefense Evasion

T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionDefense Evasion

T1218.005 MshtaDefense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1485 Data DestructionImpact

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T1489 Service StopImpact

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T1491.001 Internal DefacementImpact

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T1529 System Shutdown/RebootImpact

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T1542.003 BootkitPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.009 Shortcut ModificationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1557.001 LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB RelayCredential Access / Collection

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1560.002 Archive via LibraryCollection

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T1560.003 Archive via Custom MethodCollection

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T1561.001 Disk Content WipeImpact

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T1561.002 Disk Structure WipeImpact

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1564.001 Hidden Files and DirectoriesDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1566.003 Spearphishing via ServiceInitial Access

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T1571 Non-Standard PortCommand & Control

T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1574.013 KernelCallbackTablePersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1584.004 ServerResource Development

T1585.001 Social Media AccountsResource Development

T1585.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1588.004 Digital CertificatesResource Development

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1591 Gather Victim Org InformationReconnaissance

T1620 Reflective Code LoadingDefense Evasion

T1680 Local Storage DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

routeS0103 · Tool

ATT&CK S0103 ↗

netshS0108 · Tool

ATT&CK S0108 ↗

ResponderS0174 · Tool

ATT&CK S0174 ↗

VolgmerS0180 · Malware

ATT&CK S0180 ↗

FALLCHILLS0181 · Malware

ATT&CK S0181 ↗

ProxysvcS0238 · Malware

ATT&CK S0238 ↗

BankshotS0239 · Malware

ATT&CK S0239 ↗

RATANKBAS0241 · Malware

ATT&CK S0241 ↗

+18 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 26 tools/malware to G0032 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0032 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

Operation Dream Job — ATT&CK Campaign C0022

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records Operation Dream Job (C0022) — roughly 2019–2020 as an operation attributed to this group.¹²²

Open ATT&CK C0022 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

93 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

26 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

Origin / sponsor (North Korea — RGB (Reconnaissance General Bureau)) — curated government advisory (cited)

11 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.