G0040 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Patchwork

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Hangover Group Dropping Elephant Chinastrats MONSOON Operation Hangover — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 8 tools/malware to this group, including BADNEWS, AutoIt backdoor, Unknown Logger, TINYTYPHON.⁴⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1027.001 Binary PaddingDefense Evasion

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.005 Indicator Removal from ToolsDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1055.012 Process HollowingPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1102.001 Dead Drop ResolverCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1132.001 Standard EncodingCommand & Control

T1189 Drive-by CompromiseInitial Access

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T1197 BITS JobsPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1548.002 Bypass User Account ControlPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1559.002 Dynamic Data ExchangeExecution

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1587.002 Code Signing CertificatesResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1598.003 Spearphishing LinkReconnaissance

T1680 Local Storage DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

BADNEWSS0128 · Malware

ATT&CK S0128 ↗

AutoIt backdoorS0129 · Malware

ATT&CK S0129 ↗

Unknown LoggerS0130 · Malware

ATT&CK S0130 ↗

TINYTYPHONS0131 · Malware

ATT&CK S0131 ↗

PowerSploitS0194 · Tool

ATT&CK S0194 ↗

QuasarRATS0262 · Tool

ATT&CK S0262 ↗

NDiskMonitorS0272 · Malware

ATT&CK S0272 ↗

BackConfigS0475 · Malware

ATT&CK S0475 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0040 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

41 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

8 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

9 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.