G0086 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s Revoked by ATT&CK

Stolen Pencil

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Stolen Pencil is a threat group likely originating from DPRK that has been active since at least May 2018. The group appears to have targeted academic institutions, but its motives remain unclear.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

SparseATT&CK carries no campaigns or software for this group at this snapshot — the signature moves are a coverage gap, stated not hidden.

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

No techniques are recorded for this group in the ATT&CK snapshot below — the tradecraft heatmap is empty. That is an honest coverage gap (sparse / legacy / revoked group), never a claim that the actor does nothing.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

No named arsenalCoverage gap

ATT&CK attributes no software to G0086 at this snapshot. Absence is a finding, not a claim of harmlessness.

ATT&CK G0086 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0086 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

1 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No techniques attributed to this group in ATT&CK — a real source coverage gap, surfaced honestly, never fabricated.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Front door, Keys to kingdom, Lateral reach, Data at risk, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.