G0094 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Kimsuky

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Kimsuky is a North Korea-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Black Banshee Velvet Chollima Emerald Sleet THALLIUM APT43 TA427 Springtail — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

109

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 17 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, gh0st RAT, schtasks.¹¹²

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1007 System Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1027 Obfuscated Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1027.001 Binary PaddingDefense Evasion

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1027.012 LNK Icon SmugglingDefense Evasion

T1027.016 Junk Code InsertionDefense Evasion

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or ServiceDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1036.007 Double File ExtensionDefense Evasion

T1040 Network SniffingCredential Access / Discovery

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T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

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T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1055 Process InjectionPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1055.012 Process HollowingPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

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T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

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T1059.006 PythonExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.006 TimestompDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.002 File Transfer ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1071.003 Mail ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

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T1078.003 Local AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1098.007 Additional Local or Domain GroupsPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1102.001 Dead Drop ResolverCommand & Control

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1111 Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionCredential Access

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

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T1114.002 Remote Email CollectionCollection

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T1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1136.001 Local AccountPersistence

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T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1176.001 Browser ExtensionsPersistence

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T1185 Browser Session HijackingCollection

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1204.001 Malicious LinkExecution

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1205 Traffic SignalingPersistence / Defense Evasion / Command & Control

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T1218.005 MshtaDefense Evasion

T1218.010 Regsvr32Defense Evasion

T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1219.002 Remote Desktop SoftwareCommand & Control

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1518.001 Security Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1534 Internal SpearphishingLateral Movement

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T1539 Steal Web Session CookieCredential Access

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T1543.003 Windows ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1546.001 Change Default File AssociationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1550.002 Pass the HashDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

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T1557 Adversary-in-the-MiddleCredential Access / Collection

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1560.003 Archive via Custom MethodCollection

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1562.004 Disable or Modify System FirewallDefense Evasion

T1564.002 Hidden UsersDefense Evasion

T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

T1566 PhishingInitial Access

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T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

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T1566.002 Spearphishing LinkInitial Access

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T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

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T1583 Acquire InfrastructureResource Development

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.004 ServerResource Development

T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1584.001 DomainsResource Development

T1585 Establish AccountsResource Development

T1585.001 Social Media AccountsResource Development

T1585.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1586.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1587 Develop CapabilitiesResource Development

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1588.003 Code Signing CertificatesResource Development

T1588.005 ExploitsResource Development

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1589.003 Employee NamesReconnaissance

T1591 Gather Victim Org InformationReconnaissance

T1593 Search Open Websites/DomainsReconnaissance

T1593.001 Social MediaReconnaissance

T1593.002 Search EnginesReconnaissance

T1594 Search Victim-Owned WebsitesReconnaissance

T1596 Search Open Technical DatabasesReconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for InformationReconnaissance

T1598.003 Spearphishing LinkReconnaissance

T1608.001 Upload MalwareResource Development

T1620 Reflective Code LoadingDefense Evasion

T1656 ImpersonationDefense Evasion

T1657 Financial TheftImpact

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T1680 Local Storage DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

gh0st RATS0032 · Malware

ATT&CK S0032 ↗

schtasksS0111 · Tool

ATT&CK S0111 ↗

Gold DragonS0249 · Malware

ATT&CK S0249 ↗

Brave PrinceS0252 · Malware

ATT&CK S0252 ↗

QuasarRATS0262 · Tool

ATT&CK S0262 ↗

NOKKIS0353 · Malware

ATT&CK S0353 ↗

+9 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 17 tools/malware to G0094 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G0094 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0094 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge — Known exploits / Linked CVEs every link below traces to a named source; tier is explicit

Inferred / reported — lower confidence, never headline attribution 1 link(s)

These are not confirmed attribution. An inferred link is a structural ATT&CK chain (this group uses a tool whose reference cites the CVE); it is back-cited to the original report and never claims the source names the group.

CVE-2015-5119 →

ATT&CK attributes gh0st RAT (S0032) to this group, and that software’s ATT&CK reference cites CVE-2015-5119. Structural chain — not a statement that the report names the group.

original report (cited on the ATT&CK software page) ↗

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

109 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

17 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

15 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.