G0119 Ransomwareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Indrik Spider

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Indrik Spider is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. Indrik Spider initially started with the Dridex banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using BitPaymer, WastedLocker, and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, Indrik Spider changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Evil Corp Manatee Tempest DEV-0243 UNC2165 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a crew that turns access into an outage.

A ransomware classification means the path is funded to reach disruption and extortion — encryption, data theft for leverage, and downtime. Exposure here is a business-continuity problem, not just a patch ticket. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 8 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Cobalt Strike, Empire.³⁶

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1007 System Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1021.004 SSHLateral Movement

●

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

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T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.002 Domain AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1136 Create AccountPersistence

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T1136.001 Local AccountPersistence

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T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

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T1484.001 Group Policy ModificationPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1486 Data Encrypted for ImpactImpact

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T1489 Service StopImpact

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1555.005 Password ManagersCredential Access

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T1558.003 KerberoastingCredential Access

●

T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

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T1583 Acquire InfrastructureResource Development

T1584.004 ServerResource Development

T1585.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1587.001 MalwareResource Development

T1590 Gather Victim Network InformationReconnaissance

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

ATT&CK S0002 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

Cobalt StrikeS0154 · Malware

ATT&CK S0154 ↗

EmpireS0363 · Tool

ATT&CK S0363 ↗

DridexS0384 · Malware

ATT&CK S0384 ↗

BitPaymerS0570 · Malware

ATT&CK S0570 ↗

WastedLockerS0612 · Malware

ATT&CK S0612 ↗

DonutS0695 · Tool

ATT&CK S0695 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0119 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

33 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

8 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.