G0125 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

HAFNIUM

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Operation Exchange Marauder Silk Typhoon — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 6 tools/malware to this group, including China Chopper, PsExec, ASPXSpy, Impacket.⁴⁷

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1078.003 Local AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1098 Account ManipulationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

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T1114.002 Remote Email CollectionCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1132.001 Standard EncodingCommand & Control

T1136.002 Domain AccountPersistence

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1199 Trusted RelationshipInitial Access

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T1213.002 SharepointCollection

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T1218.011 Rundll32Defense Evasion

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1530 Data from Cloud StorageCollection

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T1550.001 Application Access TokenDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

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T1555.006 Cloud Secrets Management StoresCredential Access

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T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1564.001 Hidden Files and DirectoriesDefense Evasion

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

●

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1583.005 BotnetResource Development

T1583.006 Web ServicesResource Development

T1584.005 BotnetResource Development

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1590 Gather Victim Network InformationReconnaissance

T1590.005 IP AddressesReconnaissance

T1592.004 Client ConfigurationsReconnaissance

T1593.003 Code RepositoriesReconnaissance

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

China ChopperS0020 · Malware

ATT&CK S0020 ↗

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

ASPXSpyS0073 · Malware

ATT&CK S0073 ↗

ImpacketS0357 · Tool

ATT&CK S0357 ↗

TarraskS1011 · Malware

ATT&CK S1011 ↗

CovenantS1155 · Tool

ATT&CK S1155 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0125 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge — Known exploits / Linked CVEs every link below traces to a named source; tier is explicit

Known exploits — confirmed by named advisory 4 CVE(s)

CVE-2021-26855 →

CISA's AA21-062A and the Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center attribute the ProxyLogon Exchange exploitation chain to HAFNIUM (now tracked as Silk Typhoon), a state-sponsored group assessed to operate out of the PRC, naming both the group and the Exchange CVEs.

CISA AA21-062A — names this group + CVE ↗

CVE-2021-26857 →

CISA AA21-062A — names this group + CVE ↗

CVE-2021-26858 →

CISA AA21-062A — names this group + CVE ↗

CVE-2021-27065 →

CISA AA21-062A — names this group + CVE ↗

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

44 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

6 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

4 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.