G0126 Unknownour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Higaisa

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Motivation not classified from the public record.

We could not place this actor into a coarse motivation tier from ATT&CK’s intrusion-set type and description prose. That uncertainty is itself a finding — the tradecraft below is still cited; the “why” is a coverage gap. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 3 tools/malware to this group, including PlugX, gh0st RAT, certutil.³¹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1001.003 Protocol or Service ImpersonationCommand & Control

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1027.001 Binary PaddingDefense Evasion

T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded FileDefense Evasion

T1027.015 CompressionDefense Evasion

T1029 Scheduled TransferExfiltration

●

T1036.004 Masquerade Task or ServiceDefense Evasion

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

●

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

●

T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

●

T1059.007 JavaScriptExecution

●

T1071.001 Web ProtocolsCommand & Control

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1106 Native APIExecution

●

T1124 System Time DiscoveryDiscovery

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

●

T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

●

T1220 XSL Script ProcessingDefense Evasion

T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1564.003 Hidden WindowDefense Evasion

T1566.001 Spearphishing AttachmentInitial Access

●

T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1574.001 DLLPersistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1680 Local Storage DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

PlugXS0013 · Malware

ATT&CK S0013 ↗

gh0st RATS0032 · Malware

ATT&CK S0032 ↗

certutilS0160 · Tool

ATT&CK S0160 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G0126 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge — Known exploits / Linked CVEs every link below traces to a named source; tier is explicit

Inferred / reported — lower confidence, never headline attribution 1 link(s)

These are not confirmed attribution. An inferred link is a structural ATT&CK chain (this group uses a tool whose reference cites the CVE); it is back-cited to the original report and never claims the source names the group.

CVE-2015-5119 →

ATT&CK attributes gh0st RAT (S0032) to this group, and that software’s ATT&CK reference cites CVE-2015-5119. Structural chain — not a statement that the report names the group.

original report (cited on the ATT&CK software page) ↗

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

28 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

3 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

3 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lateral reach, Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.