G1001 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

HEXANE

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: HEXANE is a cyber espionage threat group that has targeted oil & gas, telecommunications, aviation, and internet service provider organizations since at least 2017. Targeted companies have been located in the Middle East and Africa, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, and Tunisia. HEXANE's TTPs appear similar to APT33 and OilRig but due to differences in victims and tools it is tracked as a separate entity.

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Lyceum Siamesekitten Spirlin — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2021–2022approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignHomeLand Justice. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0038.⁵¹

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 12 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Ping, ipconfig, netstat.³⁹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1010 Application Window DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1027.010 Command ObfuscationDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.005 Visual BasicExecution

●

T1069.001 Local GroupsDiscovery

T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1102.002 Bidirectional CommunicationCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

●

T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

●

T1204.002 Malicious FileExecution

●

T1518 Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1534 Internal SpearphishingLateral Movement

●

T1546.003 Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

●

T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

●

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

●

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1583.002 DNS ServerResource Development

T1585.001 Social Media AccountsResource Development

T1585.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1586.002 Email AccountsResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1589 Gather Victim Identity InformationReconnaissance

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1591.004 Identify RolesReconnaissance

T1608.001 Upload MalwareResource Development

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

PingS0097 · Tool

ipconfigS0100 · Tool

netstatS0104 · Tool

BITSAdminS0190 · Tool

ATT&CK S0190 ↗

EmpireS0363 · Tool

ATT&CK S0363 ↗

PoshC2S0378 · Tool

ATT&CK S0378 ↗

DanBotS1014 · Malware

ATT&CK S1014 ↗

+4 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 12 tools/malware to G1001 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G1001 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

HomeLand Justice — ATT&CK Campaign C0038

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records HomeLand Justice (C0038) — roughly 2021–2022 as an operation attributed to this group.⁵¹

Open ATT&CK C0038 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

36 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

12 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.