G1003 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Ember Bear

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155). Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas. Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: UNC2589 Bleeding Bear DEV-0586 Cadet Blizzard Frozenvista UAC-0056 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

coverage gap

Activity bounds

no attributed campaign

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to this group, including PsExec, Responder, Impacket, CrackMapExec.⁵¹

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003 OS Credential DumpingCredential Access

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T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

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T1003.002 Security Account ManagerCredential Access

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T1003.004 LSA SecretsCredential Access

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T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

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T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021 Remote ServicesLateral Movement

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T1036 MasqueradingDefense Evasion

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

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T1053.005 Scheduled TaskExecution / Persistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1071.004 DNSCommand & Control

T1078.001 Default AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1090.003 Multi-hop ProxyCommand & Control

T1095 Non-Application Layer ProtocolCommand & Control

T1110 Brute ForceCredential Access

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T1110.003 Password SprayingCredential Access

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T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

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T1114 Email CollectionCollection

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T1119 Automated CollectionCollection

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T1125 Video CaptureCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1195 Supply Chain CompromiseInitial Access

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T1203 Exploitation for Client ExecutionExecution

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T1210 Exploitation of Remote ServicesLateral Movement

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T1491.002 External DefacementImpact

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T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1550.002 Pass the HashDefense Evasion / Lateral Movement

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1560 Archive Collected DataCollection

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T1561.002 Disk Structure WipeImpact

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

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T1570 Lateral Tool TransferLateral Movement

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T1571 Non-Standard PortCommand & Control

T1572 Protocol TunnelingCommand & Control

T1583 Acquire InfrastructureResource Development

T1583.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1585 Establish AccountsResource Development

T1588.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.005 ExploitsResource Development

T1595.001 Scanning IP BlocksReconnaissance

T1595.002 Vulnerability ScanningReconnaissance

T1654 Log EnumerationDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

PsExecS0029 · Tool

ATT&CK S0029 ↗

ResponderS0174 · Tool

ATT&CK S0174 ↗

ImpacketS0357 · Tool

ATT&CK S0357 ↗

CrackMapExecS0488 · Tool

ATT&CK S0488 ↗

ngrokS0508 · Tool

ATT&CK S0508 ↗

BloodHoundS0521 · Tool

ATT&CK S0521 ↗

P.A.S. WebshellS0598 · Malware

ATT&CK S0598 ↗

WhisperGateS0689 · Malware

ATT&CK S0689 ↗

+3 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 11 tools/malware to G1003 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G1003 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

No attributed campaigns — coverage gap

Stated, not hidden

ATT&CK lists no first-class campaign object for G1003 at this snapshot. Public reporting may tie this actor to operations; those enter only with a named advisory under the same cite-or-die rule.

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

48 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

11 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

No attributed ATT&CK campaign object — activity bounds cannot be established.