Threats / Actors / Scattered Spider

G1015 Ransomwareour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Scattered Spider

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Roasted 0ktapus Octo Tempest Storm-0875 UNC3944 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a crew that turns access into an outage.

A ransomware classification means the path is funded to reach disruption and extortion — encryption, data theft for leverage, and downtime. Exposure here is a business-continuity problem, not just a patch ticket. All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2022–2022approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignC0027. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0027.⁷⁶

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 9 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, Tor, LaZagne, ngrok.⁶⁷

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

●

T1006 Direct Volume AccessDefense Evasion

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

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T1021.004 SSHLateral Movement

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T1021.007 Cloud ServicesLateral Movement

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T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelExfiltration

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T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

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T1059.004 Unix ShellExecution

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T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

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T1069 Permission Groups DiscoveryDiscovery

T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1070.008 Clear Mailbox DataDefense Evasion

T1074 Data StagedCollection

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T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1078.004 Cloud AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1082 System Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087 Account DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090 ProxyCommand & Control

T1098 Account ManipulationPersistence / Privilege Escalation

●

T1098.003 Additional Cloud RolesPersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1114 Email CollectionCollection

●

T1114.003 Email Forwarding RuleCollection

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T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

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T1136 Create AccountPersistence

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T1204 User ExecutionExecution

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T1213.003 Code RepositoriesCollection

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T1213.005 Messaging ApplicationsCollection

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T1217 Browser Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1219.002 Remote Desktop SoftwareCommand & Control

T1484.002 Trust ModificationPrivilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

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T1486 Data Encrypted for ImpactImpact

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T1490 Inhibit System RecoveryImpact

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T1530 Data from Cloud StorageCollection

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T1538 Cloud Service DashboardDiscovery

T1539 Steal Web Session CookieCredential Access

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T1543.002 Systemd ServicePersistence / Privilege Escalation

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T1552.001 Credentials In FilesCredential Access

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T1552.004 Private KeysCredential Access

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T1553.002 Code SigningDefense Evasion

T1555.005 Password ManagersCredential Access

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T1556.006 Multi-Factor AuthenticationPersistence / Defense Evasion / Credential Access

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T1556.009 Conditional Access PoliciesPersistence / Defense Evasion / Credential Access

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T1562.001 Disable or Modify ToolsDefense Evasion

T1564.008 Email Hiding RulesDefense Evasion

T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud StorageExfiltration

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T1572 Protocol TunnelingCommand & Control

T1578.002 Create Cloud InstanceDefense Evasion

T1580 Cloud Infrastructure DiscoveryDiscovery

T1583.001 DomainsResource Development

T1585.001 Social Media AccountsResource Development

T1588.001 MalwareResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1589 Gather Victim Identity InformationReconnaissance

T1598 Phishing for InformationReconnaissance

T1598.003 Spearphishing LinkReconnaissance

T1598.004 Spearphishing VoiceReconnaissance

T1621 Multi-Factor Authentication Request GenerationCredential Access

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T1656 ImpersonationDefense Evasion

T1657 Financial TheftImpact

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Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcome

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

TorS0183 · Tool

LaZagneS0349 · Tool

ngrokS0508 · Tool

ConnectWiseS0591 · Tool

ATT&CK S0591 ↗

WarzoneRATS0670 · Malware

ATT&CK S0670 ↗

RcloneS1040 · Tool

ATT&CK S1040 ↗

BlackCatS1068 · Malware

ATT&CK S1068 ↗

+1 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 9 tools/malware to G1015 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G1015 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

C0027 — ATT&CK Campaign C0027

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records C0027 (C0027) — roughly 2022–2022 as an operation attributed to this group.⁷⁶

Open ATT&CK C0027 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

64 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

9 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

8 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.