G1017 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

Volt Typhoon

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021 primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in…

Attributed to China — state-sponsored (PRC) by government advisory.¹⁰³¹⁰⁴

Also tracked as: BRONZE SILHOUETTE Vanguard Panda DEV-0391 UNC3236 Voltzite Insidious Taurus — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2022–2024approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

CampaignKV Botnet Activity. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0035.¹⁰¹

CampaignVersa Director Zero Day Exploitation. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0039.¹⁰²

ArsenalNamed tooling. ATT&CK attributes 17 tools/malware to this group, including Mimikatz, PsExec, Net, Tasklist.⁸⁴

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 4 — Data at risk — exfiltration. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1003.001 LSASS MemoryCredential Access

●

T1003.003 NTDSCredential Access

●

T1005 Data from Local SystemCollection

●

T1006 Direct Volume AccessDefense Evasion

T1007 System Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1010 Application Window DiscoveryDiscovery

T1012 Query RegistryDiscovery

T1016 System Network Configuration DiscoveryDiscovery

T1016.001 Internet Connection DiscoveryDiscovery

T1018 Remote System DiscoveryDiscovery

T1021.001 Remote Desktop ProtocolLateral Movement

●

T1027.002 Software PackingDefense Evasion

T1033 System Owner/User DiscoveryDiscovery

T1036.005 Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationDefense Evasion

T1036.008 Masquerade File TypeDefense Evasion

T1046 Network Service DiscoveryDiscovery

T1047 Windows Management InstrumentationExecution

●

T1049 System Network Connections DiscoveryDiscovery

T1056.001 KeyloggingCredential Access / Collection

●

T1057 Process DiscoveryDiscovery

T1059.001 PowerShellExecution

●

T1059.003 Windows Command ShellExecution

●

T1059.004 Unix ShellExecution

●

T1068 Exploitation for Privilege EscalationPrivilege Escalation

●

T1069 Permission Groups DiscoveryDiscovery

T1069.001 Local GroupsDiscovery

T1069.002 Domain GroupsDiscovery

T1070.001 Clear Windows Event LogsDefense Evasion

T1070.004 File DeletionDefense Evasion

T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and ConfigurationsDefense Evasion

T1074 Data StagedCollection

●

T1074.001 Local Data StagingCollection

●

T1078 Valid AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1078.002 Domain AccountsInitial Access / Persistence / Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion

●

T1083 File and Directory DiscoveryDiscovery

T1087.001 Local AccountDiscovery

T1087.002 Domain AccountDiscovery

T1090 ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.001 Internal ProxyCommand & Control

T1090.003 Multi-hop ProxyCommand & Control

T1105 Ingress Tool TransferCommand & Control

T1112 Modify RegistryPersistence / Defense Evasion

●

T1113 Screen CaptureCollection

●

T1120 Peripheral Device DiscoveryDiscovery

T1124 System Time DiscoveryDiscovery

T1133 External Remote ServicesInitial Access / Persistence

●

T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationDefense Evasion

T1190 Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationInitial Access

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T1217 Browser Information DiscoveryDiscovery

T1218 System Binary Proxy ExecutionDefense Evasion

T1497.001 System ChecksDefense Evasion / Discovery

T1505.003 Web ShellPersistence

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T1518 Software DiscoveryDiscovery

T1552 Unsecured CredentialsCredential Access

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T1552.004 Private KeysCredential Access

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T1555 Credentials from Password StoresCredential Access

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T1555.003 Credentials from Web BrowsersCredential Access

●

T1560.001 Archive via UtilityCollection

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T1570 Lateral Tool TransferLateral Movement

●

T1573.001 Symmetric CryptographyCommand & Control

T1584.003 Virtual Private ServerResource Development

T1584.004 ServerResource Development

T1584.005 BotnetResource Development

T1584.008 Network DevicesResource Development

T1587.004 ExploitsResource Development

T1588.002 ToolResource Development

T1588.006 VulnerabilitiesResource Development

T1589 Gather Victim Identity InformationReconnaissance

T1589.002 Email AddressesReconnaissance

T1590 Gather Victim Network InformationReconnaissance

T1590.004 Network TopologyReconnaissance

T1590.006 Network Security AppliancesReconnaissance

T1591 Gather Victim Org InformationReconnaissance

T1591.004 Identify RolesReconnaissance

T1592 Gather Victim Host InformationReconnaissance

T1593 Search Open Websites/DomainsReconnaissance

T1594 Search Victim-Owned WebsitesReconnaissance

T1596.005 Scan DatabasesReconnaissance

T1614 System Location DiscoveryDiscovery

T1654 Log EnumerationDiscovery

T1680 Local Storage DiscoveryDiscovery

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·2·3·4 — furthest is 4 · Data at risk. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 5 (Lights out) is empty — Compare: a ransomware or wiper actor lights column 5.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

MimikatzS0002 · Tool

PsExecS0029 · Tool

NetS0039 · Tool

TasklistS0057 · Tool

RegS0075 · Tool

SysteminfoS0096 · Tool

ATT&CK S0096 ↗

PingS0097 · Tool

ATT&CK S0097 ↗

ipconfigS0100 · Tool

ATT&CK S0100 ↗

+9 moreCoverage

ATT&CK attributes 17 tools/malware to G1017 in total; the full list is on the group page.

ATT&CK G1017 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

KV Botnet Activity — ATT&CK Campaign C0035

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records KV Botnet Activity (C0035) — roughly 2022–2024 as an operation attributed to this group.¹⁰¹

Open ATT&CK C0035 ↗

Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation — ATT&CK Campaign C0039

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records Versa Director Zero Day Exploitation (C0039) — roughly 2024–2024 as an operation attributed to this group.¹⁰²

Open ATT&CK C0039 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge — Known exploits / Linked CVEs every link below traces to a named source; tier is explicit

Known exploits — confirmed by named advisory 2 CVE(s)

CVE-2024-21887 →

CISA, NSA and FBI's AA24-038A attributes pre-positioning on US critical-infrastructure IT networks to Volt Typhoon, naming the group's exploitation of public-facing appliance vulnerabilities including the Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2024-21887) and Fortinet FortiOS (CVE-2022-42475) CVEs.

CISA AA24-038A — names this group + CVE ↗

CVE-2022-42475 →

CISA AA24-038A — names this group + CVE ↗

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

81 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

17 software (arsenal) — ATT&CK software pages

2 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

Origin / sponsor (China — state-sponsored (PRC)) — curated government advisory (cited)

4 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

Empty heatmap column(s): Lights out — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.