G1049 Nation-stateour call,
not MITRE’s ATT&CK Group

AppleJeus

How MITRE ATT&CK characterizes this group¹: AppleJeus is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Associated with the broader Lazarus Group umbrella of actors, AppleJeus has been active since at least 2018 and is closely aligned in resources with TEMP.hermit, another DPRK-affiliated group under the same umbrella. The group’s primary mission is to generate and launder revenue to provide financial support to the government. AppleJeus primarily…

Origin / sponsor: not established from a curated public advisory — see Coverage & confidence. Not asserted here.

Also tracked as: Gleaming Pisces Citrine Sleet UNC1720 UNC4736 — ATT&CK group page¹

Read this as · tier is our editorial call, not MITRE’s

Read as a state-directed operator, not a smash-and-grab.

A nation-state classification means patience, tradecraft, and an intelligence objective. When this name attaches to a vulnerability, the question shifts from “will someone exploit it” to “has a well-resourced service already built it into an operation.” All tradecraft below is sourced to MITRE ATT&CK.

Techniques

ATT&CK count¹

Named tools / malware

ATT&CK count²

Attributed campaigns

ATT&CK count¹

Tactics spanned

ATT&CK count¹

~2022–2023approx.

Activity bounds (campaign floor)

approximate¹

Known for

— signature moves, each sourced to ATT&CK

Campaign3CX Supply Chain Attack. ATT&CK tracks this attributed operation as C0057.⁵

ReachFurthest outcome. This actor's cited tradecraft reaches as far as outcome 5 — Lights out — disruption & extortion. (editorial mapping over ATT&CK tactics).

Tradecraft heatmap

— ATT&CK techniques mapped onto the five attacker-outcome narratives

Each row is a documented technique (MITRE ATT&CK). Each column is one of the five attacker-outcome narratives a defender funds against. A filled cell means this technique’s own ATT&CK tactic defensibly advances that outcome. The mapping of technique→outcome is our editorial alignment over ATT&CK's tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge. A filled cell means one of the technique's own ATT&CK tactics defensibly advances that outcome; enabler tactics (C2, Defense Evasion, Discovery) heat no column.

1Front door

2Keys to the kingdom

3Lateral reach

4Data at risk

5Lights out

T1566 PhishingInitial Access

●

T1657 Financial TheftImpact

●

Reach: this actor’s cited techniques light columns 1·5 — furthest is 5 · Lights out. (furthest-position idiom, reused from the landing map).

A dot = this technique advances that outcomeColumn 2 (Keys to kingdom) is empty — Compare: a credential-theft / identity actor lights column 2.Column 3 (Lateral reach) is empty — Compare: a hands-on-keyboard intruder lights column 3.Column 4 (Data at risk) is empty — Compare: an espionage / data-theft actor lights column 4.

Editorial: the technique→outcome alignment is our call over ATT&CK’s tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge — same basis the landing page declares. Enabler tactics (C2, defense evasion, discovery) heat no column.¹

Arsenal

— named tools & malware ATT&CK attributes to this group

No named arsenalCoverage gap

ATT&CK attributes no software to G1049 at this snapshot. Absence is a finding, not a claim of harmlessness.

ATT&CK G1049 ↗

Campaign highlights

— attributed operations in the ATT&CK record

3CX Supply Chain Attack — ATT&CK Campaign C0057

Attributed operation

ATT&CK records 3CX Supply Chain Attack (C0057) — roughly 2022–2023 as an operation attributed to this group.⁵

Open ATT&CK C0057 ↗

Latest activity

— with explicit confidence, and what we cannot yet claim

ATT&CK
snapshot

The most recent cited activity in this card is the ATT&CK record itself. We do not paste a “last seen this week” line we cannot source. Recency from secondary reporting appears here only when attached to a named advisory.

ATT&CK snapshot, compiled 2026-06-22Coverage gap — live “currently active” status not asserted

CVE ↔ actor bridge: no confirmed CVE link is established for this group. ATT&CK provides no first-class group→CVE relationship, so this card does not claim specific CVEs as “exploited by this actor” unless a named advisory says so. Absence of a CVE here is a coverage gap, never a clean bill — confirmed links surface as a cited, linked list as the advisory bridge grows.

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

Group identity, aliases, description — MITRE ATT&CK group page

2 techniques — ATT&CK technique pages (linked per row)

1 attributed campaign(s) — ATT&CK campaign pages

5 third-party research citations — ATT&CK external references

Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

Origin/sponsor not established from a curated public advisory. ATT&CK prose may imply attribution but is not asserted here — absence of a curated source is a coverage finding, not a clean bill of attribution.

Threat tier is OUR editorial classification (rule-based), not a MITRE field — labeled as such.

Technique → outcome heatmap is editorial alignment over ATT&CK tactic data, not a separately-sourced MITRE edge.

Activity bounds are a floor from attributed-campaign dates only — flagged approx., not a true active-since range.

ATT&CK has no first-class group→CVE relationship; this card asserts no specific CVE without a named advisory.

Empty heatmap column(s): Keys to kingdom, Lateral reach, Data at risk — consistent with this actor's nature, stated as a finding.