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Threats / Android / CVE-2011-1823
CVE-2011-1823 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Android OS vulnerability

The vold volume manager daemon in Android OS improperly trusts PF_NETLINK socket messages, allowing local attackers to execute arbitrary code and gain root privileges.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A local privilege escalation vulnerability in Android's vold daemon enables attackers with basic system access to obtain root-level control through malicious netlink socket messages, bypassing normal permission boundaries.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-09-083EPSS 0.41634 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
2 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-09-08).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.41634 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Android, Android OS. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-189 CWE-189.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious PF_NETLINK socket message targeting the vold daemon.
Business
An unprivileged application or process gains the ability to execute code with root privileges on the device.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I exploit the daemon's failure to validate message sources to inject commands that execute with elevated permissions.
Business
Complete device compromise occurs, including access to sensitive user data, system settings, and the ability to install persistent malware.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 2 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.