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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2012-1854
CVE-2012-1854 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) vulnerability

Microsoft Visual Basic for Applications contains an insecure library loading vulnerability enabling remote code execution through improper DLL loading.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An attacker can exploit insecure library loading in VBA to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the application using VBA, potentially compromising systems running Office or other VBA-enabled applications.

CISA KEV Yes · 2026-04-133EPSS 0.21028 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-04-13).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.21028 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-426 Untrusted Search Path.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious DLL and place it in a location where VBA will search for libraries during normal loading.
Business
An attacker gains ability to execute code in the context of any user opening a VBA-enabled document or application.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I distribute a document or file that triggers VBA library loading, causing the system to load my malicious DLL instead of the legitimate library.
Business
Widespread compromise becomes possible through email attachments or file-sharing mechanisms, affecting multiple users across an organization.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistent access or deploy additional malware payloads after initial code execution.
Business
Systems become subject to data theft, lateral movement, or long-term compromise without user awareness.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 3 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.