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Threats / Jenkins / CVE-2017-1000353
CVE-2017-1000353 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-07

Jenkins vulnerability

Jenkins remoting CLI deserializes untrusted SignedObject instances, allowing remote code execution by bypassing blocklist protections.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary code on Jenkins servers by sending malicious serialized Java objects through the CLI remoting interface, exploiting unsafe deserialization of SignedObject wrappers.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-10-023EPSS 0.94479 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-10-02).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.94479 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
FIRST EPSS ↗High
Severity / affected
Affected: Jenkins, Jenkins. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No threat-actor attribution is established from the public feed for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious serialized SignedObject wrapping a gadget chain and send it to the Jenkins CLI remoting port.
Business
Attacker gains remote code execution with Jenkins process privileges, enabling full system compromise and data exfiltration.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I bypass the existing deserialization blocklist by encapsulating the payload in a SignedObject, which is not filtered.
Business
Security controls fail to prevent exploitation, leaving the organization vulnerable to immediate takeover.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistent access or deploy malware after gaining code execution on the CI/CD infrastructure.
Business
Supply chain and build pipeline integrity are compromised, affecting all downstream software and deployments.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)

    • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
    • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.