basicsecurity.net
Proof, not just disclosure.
Threats / NETGEAR / CVE-2017-6077
CVE-2017-6077 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

NETGEAR Wireless Router DGN2200 vulnerability

NETGEAR DGN2200 wireless routers are vulnerable to remote code execution via OS command injection, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands with router privileges.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

This vulnerability enables direct system compromise of affected routers. The high EPSS score and confirmed exploitation in the wild indicate active abuse. Attackers can gain full control to pivot into networks, intercept traffic, or deploy persistent malware.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-03-073EPSS 0.68201 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
6 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-03-07).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.68201 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: NETGEAR, Wireless Router DGN2200. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify a DGN2200 router exposed to the internet and craft a malicious request exploiting the command injection flaw.
Business
Network perimeter is compromised; the router becomes an attacker-controlled asset inside the trusted boundary.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I execute system commands on the router to establish persistence, modify firewall rules, or enable remote access.
Business
Attacker gains sustained presence; legitimate security controls are bypassed or disabled.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I intercept or redirect internal network traffic, capture credentials, or launch attacks against connected devices.
Business
Confidentiality and integrity of internal communications are violated; downstream systems face secondary compromise risk.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 6 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.