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Threats / Cisco / CVE-2018-0173
CVE-2018-0173 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Cisco IOS and XE Software vulnerability

A vulnerability in Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software's DHCPv4 option 82 restoration function allows denial-of-service attacks through crafted DHCP packets.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unauthenticated attacker can send specially crafted DHCPv4 packets to trigger a denial-of-service condition in affected Cisco IOS and IOS XE devices. The vulnerability has been exploited in the wild.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-03-033EPSS 0.07613 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
2 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-03-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.07613 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Cisco, IOS and IOS XE Software. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-20 Improper Input Validation.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft malicious DHCPv4 packets with manipulated option 82 encapsulation to trigger processing errors in the target device.
Business
Network availability is disrupted as affected routers or switches become unresponsive, impacting business continuity and customer connectivity.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 2 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by cisco (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by ciscoCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.