Threats / RARLAB / CVE-2018-20250
CVE-2018-20250
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
RARLAB WinRAR vulnerability
WinRAR contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability enabling remote code execution through specially crafted archive files, exploited in active ransomware campaigns.
Verdict
Today item, not a backlog item.
An attacker can execute arbitrary code by crafting a malicious RAR archive that exploits path traversal during extraction, bypassing intended directory restrictions and achieving code execution with user privileges.
CISA KEV Yes · 2022-02-153Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.96274 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreExploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
13 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-02-15), flagged for known ransomware use.
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.96274 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: RARLAB, WinRAR. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-36 Absolute Path Traversal — weakness family: Path traversal / file.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I craft a RAR archive containing files with absolute path references that escape the intended extraction directory.
Business
Users unknowingly extract archives containing executable payloads placed in system-critical locations.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I distribute the malicious archive via email, file-sharing platforms, or compromised websites to maximize reach.
Business
Attack surface expands across customer base relying on WinRAR for routine file handling.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I trigger code execution when the user extracts the archive, gaining execution context under their account privileges.
Business
Ransomware or data-stealing payloads execute with user-level access, enabling encryption or exfiltration.
4
Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4
Attacker
I establish persistence or escalate privileges to compromise the system further.
Business
Incident response costs, downtime, ransom demands, and regulatory exposure accumulate across affected organizations.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05
Coverage & confidence
— what we know, and what we don’tEstablished (cited)
Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden
Disclosure & credit2
Catalogued by checkpointCNA
Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.