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Threats / Reolink / CVE-2019-11001
CVE-2019-11001 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Reolink Multiple IP Cameras vulnerability

Authenticated OS command injection in Reolink IP cameras via TestEmail functionality allows admin-level attackers to execute arbitrary commands as root.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An authenticated administrator can inject OS commands through the TestEmail feature in affected Reolink camera models, achieving remote code execution with root privileges. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-12-183EPSS 0.38369 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
1 independent public report of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
cisa.gov ↗Confirmed
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-12-18).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.38369 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Reolink, Multiple IP Cameras. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to the camera management interface using valid admin credentials.
Business
Administrative access to camera systems is typically restricted to trusted personnel; compromise of admin accounts represents a significant trust boundary violation.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious payload in the TestEmail functionality that injects shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary OS commands.
Business
The camera becomes a compromised node within the network infrastructure, potentially used as a pivot point for lateral movement.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute commands with root privileges, gaining complete control over the camera device and its underlying operating system.
Business
Full device compromise enables attackers to modify firmware, exfiltrate video feeds, disable monitoring, or establish persistent backdoors.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 1 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.