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Threats / Ivanti / CVE-2019-11539
CVE-2019-11539 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure and Policy vulnerability

Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure allow authenticated administrators to inject and execute arbitrary commands via the admin web interface, enabling privilege abuse and system compromise.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An authenticated admin can execute OS commands through the web interface due to insufficient input validation. This OS command injection vulnerability has been exploited in ransomware campaigns and poses critical risk to network infrastructure.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.98617 (verify live)4Exploit Public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
10 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.98617 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Ivanti, Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to the admin web interface using valid credentials or a compromised admin account.
Business
Administrative access is compromised, enabling lateral movement and persistence within the security appliance.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I inject shell metacharacters into an admin-accessible input field to break out of the intended command context.
Business
Input validation failures allow arbitrary command execution at the appliance OS level.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute system commands to establish reverse shells, install backdoors, or exfiltrate configuration data.
Business
The security appliance becomes a beachhead for network-wide compromise and data theft.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I use the compromised appliance to deploy ransomware payloads across connected networks and systems.
Business
Ransomware spreads from a trusted network chokepoint, encrypting critical assets and disrupting operations.
5

Lights out — disruption & extortion narrative 5

Attacker
I maintain persistence by modifying appliance configurations or installing rootkits.
Business
Long-term compromise of the security perimeter prevents detection and recovery.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Public PoC available (VulnCheck)
  • 10 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.