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Threats / Cisco / CVE-2019-1653
CVE-2019-1653 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers vulnerability

Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 routers contain improper access controls allowing unauthorized download of router configuration and diagnostic information.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An attacker can bypass access controls to retrieve sensitive router configuration and diagnostic data without authentication, potentially exposing network credentials and topology details for further compromise.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033EPSS 0.99876 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
995 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99876 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Cisco, Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-284 Improper Access Control — weakness family: Authorization / access control.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-284 · Improper Access ControlAuthorization / access control
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify the target router model through network reconnaissance or default gateway probing.
Business
Network perimeter security is compromised by exposed router identity and accessibility.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I access restricted URLs on the router without authentication due to improper access control implementation.
Business
Administrative access controls fail to protect sensitive management interfaces.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I download the router configuration file containing credentials, VPN settings, and network policies.
Business
Credential exposure enables lateral movement and VPN tunnel compromise across the organization.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I extract diagnostic information revealing network topology, connected devices, and system vulnerabilities.
Business
Detailed network intelligence facilitates targeted attacks against internal systems and users.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 995 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by cisco (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by ciscoCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.