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Threats / Netis / CVE-2019-19356
CVE-2019-19356 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Netis WF2419 Devices vulnerability

Netis WF2419 devices contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the web management interface allowing unauthenticated remote code execution with root privileges.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands on affected Netis WF2419 routers through the web management page, gaining full device control. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild with high exploit probability.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033EPSS 0.27962 (verify live)4Exploit Public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
25 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.27962 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Netis, WF2419 Devices. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify the Netis WF2419 web management interface is accessible and vulnerable to command injection.
Business
Network perimeter security is compromised; the router becomes an entry point for lateral movement.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious request injecting OS commands into the vulnerable parameter, executed as root.
Business
Attacker gains complete control of network traffic, DNS resolution, and device configuration.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistence and pivot to internal network segments or exfiltrate credentials.
Business
Organizational data and connected systems face direct compromise; incident response costs escalate.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Public PoC available (VulnCheck)
  • 25 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.