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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2020-1472
CVE-2020-1472 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft Netlogon vulnerability

Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) privilege escalation vulnerability allowing attackers to establish vulnerable secure channel connections to domain controllers and execute arbitrary code.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

Critical remote privilege escalation in Netlogon authentication protocol. Exploited in active ransomware campaigns. Enables unauthenticated attackers on the network to compromise domain controllers and achieve full Active Directory control.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.99512 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
147 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99512 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, Netlogon. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-330 Insufficient Randomness — weakness family: Cryptography.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I establish a malicious Netlogon secure channel connection to a domain controller by exploiting the cryptographic weakness in MS-NRPC.
Business
Domain controller authentication is bypassed, eliminating the primary security boundary for the Active Directory infrastructure.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I escalate privileges through the vulnerable channel to gain domain administrator equivalent access without valid credentials.
Business
Attacker obtains unrestricted access to all domain-joined systems, user accounts, and sensitive data managed by Active Directory.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I deploy ransomware or persistence mechanisms across the compromised domain infrastructure.
Business
Organization experiences widespread encryption of critical systems, data exfiltration, and extended recovery timelines affecting business continuity.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 147 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.