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Threats / D-Link / CVE-2020-25079
CVE-2020-25079 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

D-Link DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L Devices vulnerability

D-Link DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L devices contain a command injection vulnerability in ddns_enc.cgi that allows remote code execution. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

Command injection in a network-accessible CGI endpoint enables unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary system commands on affected D-Link camera devices. Active exploitation and end-of-life status create elevated risk.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-08-053EPSS 0.52717 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-08-05).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.52717 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: D-Link, DCS-2530L and DCS-2670L Devices. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-77 Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify the vulnerable ddns_enc.cgi endpoint on exposed D-Link devices via network scanning.
Business
Reconnaissance phase establishes attack surface; no immediate business impact but signals vulnerability exposure.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious request injecting shell commands into the CGI parameter to bypass input validation.
Business
Attacker gains code execution capability; device integrity is compromised.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute commands to establish persistence, exfiltrate video streams, or pivot to internal networks.
Business
Confidentiality breach of surveillance footage; potential lateral movement into corporate infrastructure.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I deploy malware or use the device as a botnet node for distributed attacks.
Business
Device becomes attack vector; organization faces liability and operational disruption.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 3 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.