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Threats / D-Link / CVE-2020-25506
CVE-2020-25506 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

D-Link DNS-320 Device vulnerability

D-Link DNS-320 devices contain a command injection vulnerability in sytem_mgr.cgi allowing remote code execution. The vulnerability is actively exploited in the wild.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A command injection flaw in the DNS-320 management interface enables unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary system commands remotely. Active exploitation and high EPSS score indicate immediate risk to deployed devices.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033EPSS 0.99968 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
736 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99968 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: D-Link, DNS-320 Device. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious request to sytem_mgr.cgi containing shell metacharacters to inject arbitrary commands.
Business
The organization's network-attached storage device becomes a compromised asset under attacker control.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I execute commands with the privileges of the web service process to establish persistence and lateral movement.
Business
Attackers gain foothold for data exfiltration, encryption for ransom, or pivot to other network segments.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I enumerate stored credentials, configuration files, and connected shares accessible from the compromised device.
Business
Sensitive data stored on or accessible through the NAS becomes exposed to theft or manipulation.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 736 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.