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Threats / Cisco / CVE-2020-3153
CVE-2020-3153 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Cisco AnyConnect Secure vulnerability

Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows improperly handles directory paths, allowing authenticated attackers to write malicious files to arbitrary locations with system privileges via DLL hijacking or preloading.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An authenticated attacker on Windows can exploit improper path handling in AnyConnect to place malicious files in system-privileged locations, enabling privilege escalation and code execution. This vulnerability has been exploited in ransomware campaigns.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-10-243Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.28307 (verify live)4Exploit Public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
2 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-10-24), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.28307 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Cisco, AnyConnect Secure. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I obtain valid Windows credentials through phishing, credential stuffing, or insider access.
Business
Attacker gains foothold with user-level access to a Windows endpoint running AnyConnect.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious DLL and exploit the path-handling flaw to write it to a directory where AnyConnect or Windows processes search for libraries.
Business
Malicious code is positioned in a trusted system location, bypassing application-level security controls.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I trigger DLL loading through normal AnyConnect operation or system process execution, causing the malicious library to load with system privileges.
Business
Attacker achieves privilege escalation and arbitrary code execution in the system context.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I deploy ransomware, backdoors, or lateral movement tools with full system access.
Business
Organization suffers data encryption, exfiltration, or compromise of network infrastructure.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Public PoC available (VulnCheck)
  • 2 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by cisco (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by ciscoCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.