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Threats / VMware / CVE-2020-3992
CVE-2020-3992 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

VMware ESXi vulnerability

VMware ESXi OpenSLP service contains a use-after-free vulnerability allowing remote code execution from the management network via port 427.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

A use-after-free flaw in ESXi's OpenSLP implementation enables unauthenticated remote code execution for attackers with management network access. Active exploitation and ransomware deployment have been observed.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.83015 (verify live)4Exploit Public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
11 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.83015 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: VMware, ESXi. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-416 Use After Free — weakness family: Memory safety.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-416 · Use After FreeMemory safety
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify ESXi hosts with OpenSLP listening on port 427 within the management network segment.
Business
Hypervisor inventory and network topology become visible to internal reconnaissance.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious OpenSLP packet that triggers the use-after-free condition in memory management.
Business
Arbitrary code execution occurs with hypervisor-level privileges.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistent access or deploy ransomware payloads across the virtualized infrastructure.
Business
Virtual machines and critical services become encrypted or unavailable; business operations halt.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Public PoC available (VulnCheck)
  • 11 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by vmware (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by vmwareCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.