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Threats / GitLab / CVE-2021-22175
CVE-2021-22175 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

GitLab vulnerability

GitLab contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in webhook functionality that allows attackers to make requests to internal network resources.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An SSRF flaw in GitLab's webhook implementation enables attackers to probe or access internal services and resources on the server's network, potentially leading to information disclosure or lateral movement within infrastructure.

CISA KEV Yes · 2026-02-183EPSS 0.53372 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
3 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-02-18).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.53372 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: GitLab, GitLab. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious webhook URL pointing to an internal network resource or service.
Business
Internal services and network topology become exposed to reconnaissance and potential compromise.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I trigger webhook execution to force the GitLab server to make requests to internal addresses I specify.
Business
Attackers gain unauthorized access to internal APIs, databases, or administrative interfaces not exposed externally.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I enumerate internal services and extract sensitive data or credentials from responses.
Business
Confidential information and authentication tokens are leaked, enabling further system compromise.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 3 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by GitLab (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by GitLabCNA
    Credited with finding itThanks [@myster](https://hackerone.com/myster?type=user) for reporting this vulnerability through our HackerOne bug boununspecified