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Threats / Ivanti / CVE-2021-22899
CVE-2021-22899 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure vulnerability

Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure contains a command injection vulnerability in Windows File Resource Profiles that allows authenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A command injection flaw in Pulse Connect Secure enables authenticated users to achieve remote code execution through malformed File Resource Profile inputs. The vulnerability has been observed in active exploitation.

CISA KEV Yes · 2021-11-033EPSS 0.22343 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
2 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2021-11-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.22343 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Ivanti, Pulse Connect Secure. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-77 Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to Pulse Connect Secure using valid credentials.
Business
Legitimate user accounts or compromised credentials provide initial access to the VPN gateway.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft a malicious Windows File Resource Profile containing shell metacharacters or command sequences.
Business
The application fails to sanitize user input before passing it to system command execution.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I submit the payload through the File Resource Profile configuration interface.
Business
The injected commands execute with the privileges of the Pulse Connect Secure service process.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I achieve arbitrary code execution on the gateway server.
Business
An attacker gains control of a critical network access point, enabling lateral movement and data exfiltration.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 2 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by hackerone (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by hackeroneCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.