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Threats / Aviatrix / CVE-2021-40870
CVE-2021-40870 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Aviatrix Controller vulnerability

Aviatrix Controller allows unauthenticated users to upload files with dangerous types and traverse directories, enabling arbitrary code execution.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit unrestricted file upload combined with directory traversal to execute arbitrary code on the Aviatrix Controller, bypassing authentication controls entirely.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-01-183EPSS 0.92382 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
627 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-01-18).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.92382 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Aviatrix, Aviatrix Controller. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-25 CWE-25, CWE-96 CWE-96 — weakness family: Path traversal / file, Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-25 · CWE-25CWE-96 · CWE-96Path traversal / file, Injection
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious file and submit it to the upload endpoint without credentials.
Business
Authentication controls are completely bypassed, exposing the system to any network-connected attacker.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I use directory traversal sequences to place my file outside the intended upload directory.
Business
File placement restrictions fail, allowing code to reach executable locations in the system.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I upload a dangerous file type that the application fails to validate or restrict.
Business
File type validation is ineffective, permitting executable content to be stored.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I trigger execution of the uploaded file through application logic or direct access.
Business
Arbitrary code runs with the privileges of the Aviatrix Controller process.
5

Lights out — disruption & extortion narrative 5

Attacker
I gain full control of the controller and pivot to compromise the entire network infrastructure.
Business
Critical infrastructure is compromised, enabling lateral movement and persistent access to cloud connectivity systems.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 627 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.