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Threats / Cisco / CVE-2022-20699
CVE-2022-20699 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Cisco Small Business RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 Series R vulnerability

A vulnerability in Cisco Small Business RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 routers allows attackers to execute arbitrary code, elevate privileges, bypass authentication, or cause denial of service.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

This vulnerability poses critical risk due to high EPSS score and active exploitation. Affected routers are perimeter devices handling authentication and traffic control, making compromise a direct path to network intrusion and lateral movement.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-03-033EPSS 0.72458 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
1 independent public report of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
cisa.gov ↗Confirmed
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-03-03).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.72458 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Cisco, Small Business RV160, RV260, RV340, and RV345 Series Routers. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-785 CWE-785.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I bypass authentication controls on the router management interface or exploit the vulnerability without credentials.
Business
Attackers gain unauthorized access to network perimeter security controls, enabling reconnaissance and lateral movement into internal systems.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I execute arbitrary code or commands on the router with elevated privileges.
Business
Attackers establish persistent control over network traffic routing, VPN termination, and security policy enforcement.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I load unsigned or malicious firmware to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Business
Attackers maintain long-term compromise of network infrastructure, complicating incident response and enabling data exfiltration.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I trigger denial of service conditions on the router.
Business
Network connectivity and remote access capabilities are disrupted, impacting business continuity and remote workforce operations.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 1 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by cisco (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by ciscoCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.