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Threats / Atlassian / CVE-2022-26138
CVE-2022-26138 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Atlassian Confluence vulnerability

Atlassian Confluence Questions For App contains hard-coded credentials exposed in plaintext, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to Confluence and view all content accessible to confluence-users group membe

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A remote attacker can exploit hard-coded credentials in the Questions For Confluence App to authenticate without authorization, access sensitive content, and potentially escalate privileges within the Confluence environment.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-07-293EPSS 0.9817 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
708 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-07-29).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.9817 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Atlassian, Confluence. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-798 Hard-coded Credentials — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-798 · Hard-coded CredentialsAuthentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I discover hard-coded credentials in the Confluence Questions For App and use them to authenticate as a legitimate user without requiring valid credentials.
Business
Unauthorized access to Confluence content compromises data confidentiality and enables potential intellectual property theft or competitive intelligence gathering.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I leverage the compromised account to enumerate and access all content visible to the confluence-users group, including sensitive documents and discussions.
Business
Exposure of confidential business information, project plans, and internal communications creates compliance violations and reputational damage.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I use the authenticated session to modify or delete content, or establish persistence for ongoing unauthorized access to the Confluence instance.
Business
Data integrity is compromised, operational continuity is disrupted, and incident response costs increase significantly.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 708 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by atlassian (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by atlassianCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.