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Threats / Veeam / CVE-2022-26501
CVE-2022-26501 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Veeam Backup & Replication vulnerability

Veeam Backup & Replication contains an authentication bypass in the Distribution Service that allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the internal API.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit missing authentication controls in Veeam's Distribution Service to upload and execute arbitrary code, leading to complete system compromise and data exfiltration.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-12-133Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.04279 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-12-13), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.04279 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Veeam, Backup & Replication. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-306 Missing Authentication — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-306 · Missing AuthenticationAuthentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify the Veeam Distribution Service exposed on the network without authentication requirements.
Business
The backup infrastructure, trusted to protect critical data, becomes an entry point for unauthorized access.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I send malicious code directly to the internal API functions without providing credentials.
Business
Security controls designed to restrict administrative functions are completely bypassed.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I upload and execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Veeam service.
Business
Attackers gain persistent access to backup systems and can encrypt or exfiltrate all protected data.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I establish command and control over the backup infrastructure to deploy ransomware across the environment.
Business
Recovery capabilities are destroyed, forcing the organization to pay ransom or accept permanent data loss.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 5 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by mitre (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by mitreCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.