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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2022-26925
CVE-2022-26925 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft Windows vulnerability

Microsoft Windows LSA spoofing vulnerability allows attackers to coerce domain controllers into NTLM authentication to attacker-controlled systems, enabling credential interception and lateral movement.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this spoofing flaw to intercept NTLM authentication exchanges from domain controllers, potentially compromising network credentials and enabling unauthorized access to domain resources.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-07-013EPSS 0.09823 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
6 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-07-01).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.09823 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, Windows. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-306 Missing Authentication — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-306 · Missing AuthenticationAuthentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a request that coerces the target domain controller to initiate NTLM authentication to my system.
Business
Domain controller authentication credentials are exposed to interception and offline cracking.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I capture the NTLM authentication exchange and extract the domain controller's credential material.
Business
Attacker gains cryptographic material enabling impersonation of critical infrastructure.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I use the compromised credentials to authenticate as the domain controller across the network.
Business
Attacker achieves lateral movement and access to sensitive systems and data throughout the domain.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 6 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.