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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2022-44698
CVE-2022-44698 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft Defender vulnerability

Microsoft Defender SmartScreen security feature bypass allows attackers to evade Mark of the Web defenses using specially crafted malicious files.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

A security feature bypass in Microsoft Defender SmartScreen permits attackers to circumvent MOTW protections, enabling delivery of malicious files that would normally trigger warnings. This vulnerability has been exploited in ransomware campaigns.

CISA KEV Yes · 2022-12-133Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.76106 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
9 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2022-12-13), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.76106 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, Defender. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-755 Improper Handling of Exceptions.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious file designed to bypass Mark of the Web detection mechanisms in SmartScreen.
Business
Security controls fail to identify and block the malicious file before user execution.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I deliver the crafted file to target users, bypassing email and web gateway protections that rely on MOTW indicators.
Business
Malware reaches end-user systems without standard security warnings or blocks.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute the payload on compromised systems to establish persistence and lateral movement.
Business
Ransomware operators gain network access and deploy encryption attacks across the organization.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 9 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.