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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2023-29357
CVE-2023-29357 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability

Microsoft SharePoint Server vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers with spoofed JWT tokens to bypass authentication and gain administrator privileges, enabling network attacks.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An authentication bypass flaw in SharePoint Server permits attackers holding forged JWT credentials to escalate to administrative access without legitimate credentials, facilitating unauthorized system compromise and data exfiltration.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-01-103Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.99618 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
507 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-01-10), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99618 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, SharePoint Server. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-303 CWE-303 — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-303 · CWE-303Authentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I obtain or forge JWT authentication tokens through credential theft or cryptographic weakness.
Business
Attackers gain entry to SharePoint infrastructure without legitimate user credentials, circumventing perimeter security controls.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I present the spoofed JWT tokens to SharePoint Server to bypass authentication mechanisms.
Business
Authentication systems fail to validate token legitimacy, allowing unauthorized access to proceed unchallenged.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I escalate my access level to administrator privileges within the compromised SharePoint instance.
Business
Attackers gain full administrative control over document repositories, user accounts, and system configurations.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I exfiltrate sensitive documents, deploy malware, or establish persistence mechanisms across the SharePoint environment.
Business
Confidential business data is stolen, systems are compromised for ransomware deployment, and organizational operations are disrupted.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 507 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.