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Threats / SonicWall / CVE-2023-44221
CVE-2023-44221 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

SonicWall SMA100 Appliances vulnerability

SonicWall SMA100 appliances contain an OS command injection vulnerability in the SSL-VPN management interface allowing authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary commands.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A remote authenticated attacker with administrative privileges can inject OS commands through the SSL-VPN management interface, executing arbitrary code as the 'nobody' user on affected SonicWall SMA100 appliances.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-05-013EPSS 0.74933 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-05-01).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.74933 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: SonicWall, SMA100 Appliances. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to the SMA100 SSL-VPN management interface using valid administrative credentials.
Business
Administrative access to VPN appliances is typically restricted to trusted personnel, limiting initial attack surface.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I inject OS commands through the management interface input fields to break out of intended application logic.
Business
Compromised VPN appliances can be used as pivot points to access internal networks and sensitive corporate resources.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute arbitrary commands as the 'nobody' user to establish persistence or gather system information.
Business
Attackers gain foothold access to critical infrastructure, enabling lateral movement, data exfiltration, and potential network-wide compromise.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 5 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by sonicwall (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by sonicwallCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.