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Threats / Apache / CVE-2023-46604
CVE-2023-46604 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Apache ActiveMQ vulnerability

Apache ActiveMQ contains a deserialization vulnerability in the OpenWire protocol allowing remote code execution through malicious serialized class types.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

A remote attacker with network access to an ActiveMQ broker can execute arbitrary shell commands by crafting malicious serialized objects that instantiate arbitrary classes on the broker's classpath.

CISA KEV Yes · 2023-11-023Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.99654 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
119 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2023-11-02), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.99654 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Apache, ActiveMQ. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious serialized object targeting the OpenWire protocol with a class type that exists on the broker's classpath.
Business
The broker deserializes untrusted data without proper validation, instantiating the attacker-controlled class.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I trigger instantiation of a gadget class that executes shell commands during object construction or initialization.
Business
Arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker with the privileges of the ActiveMQ process.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish command execution to deploy ransomware, exfiltrate data, or pivot to internal systems.
Business
Critical infrastructure and business operations are compromised, leading to data loss, service disruption, and financial impact.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 119 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by apache (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by apacheCNA
    Credited with finding it[email protected]finder