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Threats / Citrix / CVE-2023-6548
CVE-2023-6548 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway vulnerability

Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway contain a code injection vulnerability enabling authenticated remote code execution on the management interface.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An authenticated attacker with access to NSIP, CLIP, or SNIP can inject and execute arbitrary code on the management interface, leading to full system compromise. Active exploitation has been observed in the wild.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-01-173EPSS 0.03191 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
8 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-01-17).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.03191 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Citrix, NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-94 Code Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-94 · Code InjectionInjection
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to the NetScaler management interface using valid credentials or by reaching the internal network segment.
Business
Administrative access controls fail to prevent lateral movement from network segments with management interface visibility.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I inject malicious code through the management interface to bypass input validation and execute arbitrary commands.
Business
Code injection defenses are insufficient, allowing attackers to escalate from authenticated access to remote code execution.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I gain full control of the NetScaler appliance and use it as a pivot point to compromise the broader network infrastructure.
Business
The appliance becomes a trusted attack platform for lateral movement, data exfiltration, and persistence within critical network segments.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 8 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by Citrix (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by CitrixCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.