Threats / Google / CVE-2023-7024
CVE-2023-7024
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
Google Chromium WebRTC vulnerability
Heap buffer overflow in Chromium WebRTC allows remote attackers to corrupt heap memory via crafted HTML, potentially enabling code execution in browsers using WebRTC.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
A remote attacker can deliver a malicious HTML page to trigger heap corruption in WebRTC implementations. Successful exploitation could lead to arbitrary code execution within the browser process, affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability of user systems.
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreReported exploitation
5 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-01-02).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.07356 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Google, Chromium WebRTC. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write — weakness family: Memory safety.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I craft an HTML page containing WebRTC payloads designed to overflow a heap buffer.
Business
Users visiting the malicious page face potential browser compromise and system-level code execution.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I host the page on a website or distribute it via email, social engineering, or ad networks.
Business
Attack surface expands across web traffic; defense perimeter depends on browser patch adoption rates.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I achieve arbitrary code execution within the victim's browser context upon page load.
Business
Attackers gain foothold for data theft, malware installation, or lateral movement into enterprise networks.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05