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Threats / D-Link / CVE-2024-3272
CVE-2024-3272 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

D-Link Multiple NAS Devices vulnerability

D-Link NAS devices contain hard-coded credentials enabling authenticated command injection and remote code execution.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

Hard-coded credentials in D-Link DNS-series NAS devices allow attackers to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands remotely. The high EPSS score and active exploitation indicate immediate risk to exposed devices.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-04-113EPSS 0.98038 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
6 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-04-11).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.98038 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: D-Link, Multiple NAS Devices. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-798 Hard-coded Credentials — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
WeaknessCWE-798 · Hard-coded CredentialsAuthentication
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I discover or obtain the hard-coded credential embedded in the device firmware.
Business
Authentication controls fail to prevent unauthorized access to administrative functions.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I authenticate to the NAS device using the hard-coded credential over the network.
Business
The device grants me authenticated session access without verifying legitimate ownership.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I inject malicious commands through authenticated interfaces to execute arbitrary code on the device.
Business
The device processes unsanitized input from authenticated users, allowing command execution.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I gain full control of the NAS device and access or modify stored data.
Business
Confidentiality and integrity of data stored on the NAS are compromised; business operations dependent on the device are disrupted.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 6 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by VulDB (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by VulDBCNA
    Credited with finding itnetsecfishfinder