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Threats / VMware / CVE-2024-37085
CVE-2024-37085 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

VMware ESXi vulnerability

VMware ESXi authentication bypass via Active Directory group recreation allows privileged AD users to regain full host access after group deletion.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

An attacker with sufficient Active Directory permissions can bypass ESXi authentication by recreating a deleted AD group configured for host administration, gaining full control of the ESXi host. This vulnerability is actively exploited in ransomware campaigns.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-07-303Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.2677 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
27 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-07-30), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.2677 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: VMware, ESXi. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-305 CWE-305.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify an ESXi host configured to use Active Directory for authentication and locate the administrative group name.
Business
Attacker gains visibility into authentication architecture and administrative group configuration.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I leverage my Active Directory permissions to recreate the deleted administrative group with the same name.
Business
Administrative controls are circumvented through legitimate directory service access.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I authenticate to the ESXi host using the recreated AD group, obtaining full administrative privileges.
Business
Complete host compromise enables deployment of ransomware, data exfiltration, or lateral movement.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 27 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by vmware (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by vmwareCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.