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Threats / Microsoft / CVE-2024-38213
CVE-2024-38213 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Microsoft Windows vulnerability

Microsoft Windows SmartScreen contains a security feature bypass vulnerability allowing attackers to circumvent SmartScreen protections via malicious files.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

A feature bypass in Windows SmartScreen enables attackers to deliver malicious files while evading the security warning system. Active exploitation in the wild increases risk for organizations relying on SmartScreen as a defense layer.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-08-133EPSS 0.1337 (verify live)4
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Reported exploitation
10 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-08-13).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.1337 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Microsoft, Windows. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-693 Protection Mechanism Failure.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a malicious file designed to bypass SmartScreen's detection mechanisms.
Business
End users receive no warning prompt and may execute dangerous payloads, reducing visibility into threats.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I distribute the file through email, downloads, or file-sharing channels where SmartScreen would normally alert users.
Business
Attack surface expands as the primary user-facing security control fails to trigger, increasing successful compromise rates.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I gain execution on target systems without user awareness of the security risk.
Business
Incident response times lengthen and breach detection becomes delayed, allowing lateral movement and data exfiltration.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • 10 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Catalogued by microsoft (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by microsoftCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.