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Threats / SonicWall / CVE-2024-53704
CVE-2024-53704 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

SonicWall SonicOS vulnerability

SonicWall SonicOS contains an improper authentication vulnerability in the SSLVPN mechanism allowing remote attackers to bypass authentication without valid credentials.

Verdict

Today item, not a backlog item.

This authentication bypass in a widely-deployed VPN appliance enables unauthenticated remote access to protected networks. Active exploitation and ransomware deployment demonstrate immediate operational risk to organizations relying on SonicOS for perimeter security.

CISA KEV Yes · 2025-02-183Ransomware use Flagged3EPSS 0.95132 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
385 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2025-02-18), flagged for known ransomware use.
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.95132 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: SonicWall, SonicOS. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-287 Improper Authentication — weakness family: Authentication.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I identify the SSLVPN authentication weakness and craft requests that bypass credential validation.
Business
Attackers gain unauthorized remote access to the corporate network without valid user credentials.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I establish a foothold inside the network perimeter and move laterally to identify high-value systems.
Business
Internal systems become exposed to reconnaissance and compromise, expanding the attack surface beyond the VPN gateway.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I deploy ransomware payloads across compromised systems to encrypt critical business data.
Business
Operations halt as ransomware encrypts files; the organization faces extortion demands and potential data theft.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • Ransomware-use flag (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 385 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by sonicwall (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by sonicwallCNA
    Credited with finding itDaan Keuper, Thijs Alkemade and Khaled Nassar of Computest Security through Trend Micro (Zero Day Initiative)reporter