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Threats / Samsung / CVE-2024-7399
CVE-2024-7399 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server vulnerability

Samsung MagicINFO 9 Server contains a path traversal vulnerability allowing arbitrary file writes with system privileges. The flaw is actively exploited in the wild.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An unauthenticated or low-privileged attacker can exploit path traversal and file upload flaws to write malicious files to arbitrary locations on the server, potentially achieving remote code execution with system-level access.

CISA KEV Yes · 2026-04-243EPSS 0.91941 (verify live)4Exploit Weaponized · public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Fully weaponized — public exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
113 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-04-24).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.91941 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Samsung, MagicINFO 9 Server. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-22 Path Traversal, CWE-434 Unrestricted File Upload — weakness family: Path traversal / file.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I craft a request with directory traversal sequences to bypass path restrictions and write a file outside the intended directory.
Business
Attacker gains ability to place executable code in critical system locations, bypassing normal access controls.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I write a malicious script or binary to a location where it will be executed by the system service or web server process.
Business
Attacker achieves code execution under the privileges of the MagicINFO service, typically system or root level.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I establish persistent access or lateral movement within the network using the compromised server as a foothold.
Business
Organization loses control of a critical display management system and faces potential compromise of dependent infrastructure.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Weaponized exploit available (VulnCheck)
  • 113 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by samsung.tv_appliance (CNA)
  • Named finder/reporter credit (CVE.org)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • Disclosure & credit2