Threats / TeamT5 / CVE-2024-7694
CVE-2024-7694
· EUVD no mirror located
· GCVE no mirror located
Verified 2026-06-22
TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware vulnerability
TeamT5 ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware fails to validate uploaded file content, allowing authenticated administrators to upload malicious files and execute arbitrary system commands on the server.
Verdict
Today item — known-exploited.
An authenticated administrator can bypass file upload restrictions in ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware to upload and execute malicious files, achieving remote code execution on the protected server with full system privileges.
01
Is it exploitable?
— the evidence, ranked above the scoreReported exploitation
1 independent public report of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2026-02-17).
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.01807 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: TeamT5, ThreatSonar Anti-Ransomware. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-434 Unrestricted File Upload — weakness family: Path traversal / file.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
02
Who’s exploiting it?
— attribution turns risk into urgencyAttribution not established
No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.
03
Why it matters
— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board1
Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1
Attacker
I authenticate as an administrator to the ThreatSonar platform.
Business
Administrative access to security tools is typically restricted to trusted personnel; compromise of this role is a critical control failure.
2
Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2
Attacker
I upload a file with a dangerous type that bypasses content validation checks.
Business
The security product's core function—preventing malicious file execution—is inverted into a delivery mechanism for attacker payloads.
3
Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3
Attacker
I trigger execution of the uploaded file to run arbitrary system commands on the server.
Business
The protected infrastructure is compromised at the application layer, giving attackers direct control over systems the product was meant to defend.
04
What to do
— defensible action- Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05