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Threats / Ivanti / CVE-2024-8190
CVE-2024-8190 · EUVD no mirror located · GCVE no mirror located Verified 2026-06-22

Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance vulnerability

Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the administrative console that allows authenticated admins to execute arbitrary operating system commands.

Verdict

Today item — known-exploited.

An authenticated attacker with application admin privileges can inject OS commands through the administrative console, potentially leading to full system compromise, data exfiltration, or lateral movement within the infrastructure.

CISA KEV Yes · 2024-09-133EPSS 0.88955 (verify live)4Exploit Public PoC5
01

Is it exploitable?

— the evidence, ranked above the score
Exploit available
Public proof-of-concept exploit code is cataloged for this vulnerability.We link the existence of the exploit; we do not host or redistribute payloads.
Reported exploitation
16 independent public reports of in-the-wild exploitation are cataloged.Distinct reporting sources (vendor, incident response, government); open them for the underlying claims.
Exploited in the wild
Listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog (added 2024-09-13).
CISA KEV ↗Confirmed
Probability (EPSS)
EPSS 0.88955 — modeled likelihood of exploitation activity.EPSS is a daily-changing model output — open the source for today's value.
Severity / affected
Affected: Ivanti, Cloud Services Appliance. Confirm exact fixed builds in the vendor advisory.
NVD ↗Reported
Weakness (CWE)
Mapped to CWE-78 OS Command Injection — weakness family: Injection.CWE assignment from the public NVD record; the weakness class drives how the flaw is exploited.
NVD ↗Reported
02

Who’s exploiting it?

— attribution turns risk into urgency
Attribution not established

No confirmed (advisory-backed) threat-actor attribution is established for this record. Absence of a named actor is not absence of compromise — see Coverage & confidence.

03

Why it matters

— the attack path, told twice: adversary, then board
1

Front door — unauthenticated access narrative 1

Attacker
I authenticate to the CSA administrative console using valid admin credentials.
Business
Insider threat or compromised admin account creates direct risk to appliance integrity.
2

Keys to the kingdom — privilege/identity takeover narrative 2

Attacker
I craft malicious input containing OS command sequences in an administrative function.
Business
Command injection bypasses application-level controls, exposing underlying OS to direct manipulation.
3

Lateral reach — past segmentation narrative 3

Attacker
I execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the CSA process.
Business
Attacker gains operational control equivalent to the service account, enabling data access, system modification, or persistence mechanisms.
4

Data at risk — exfiltration narrative 4

Attacker
I establish persistence or pivot to connected systems and cloud infrastructure.
Business
Compromise of cloud services appliance creates bridgehead for attacking dependent cloud environments and customer data.
04

What to do

— defensible action
  • Remediate per the vendor advisory — confirm the fixed build for your version and verify exposure.1
Say it to the boardA vulnerability with this evidence profile is a defensible budget line, not a backlog ticket — fund the change against the proof above.
05

Coverage & confidence

— what we know, and what we don’t

Established (cited)

  • KEV listing (CISA)
  • EPSS probability (FIRST)
  • Public PoC available (VulnCheck)
  • 16 reported-exploitation source(s)
  • CWE weakness mapping (NVD)
  • Public exploit availability
  • Catalogued by ivanti (CNA)
  • Coverage gaps — stated, not hidden

  • No EUVD / GCVE mirror in feed — single-authority dependency for the identifier.
  • EPSS & exposure are time-varying; verify live at the source.
  • Threat-actor attribution not established from feed data — absence of a name is not absence of compromise.
  • No finder/reporter credit recorded in the public CVE entry — the work behind this find is unattributed.
  • Disclosure & credit2
    Catalogued by ivantiCNA
    Credited with finding itNo finder named in the public CVE record — the work behind this find is unattributed.